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ABRAHAM'S DEIFIC DEFENSE: PROBLEMS WITH
INSANITY, FAITH, AND KNOWING RIGHT
FROM WRONG
Andrew j. Demko*
INTRODUCTION
Moments after the angel steadies Abraham's hand,1 a local sheriff
arrests the father of faith. Months later, the trial begins and Abraham
is charged with the attempted murder of his son Isaac. Abraham has a
team of lawyers who are aware that he is being tried in a M'Naghten2
jurisdiction where there is a possible insanity defense to the charge of
attempted murder against Abraham. Courts, in these jurisdictions,
hold that a person who is commanded by the voice of God is not only
experiencing a delusion, but is also unable to know right from wrong
and, in some cases, control his actions. These courts find that the
victims of such a delusion may know what they are doing is against the
law, but are unable to determine their actions are morally wrong. Fur-
thermore, other courts have found a command from God to take away
any meaningful choice to control one's actions. Abraham has a sound
insanity defense.
Can we really imagine Abraham using this defense? Is faith a de-
lusion? The problems with what is now called the deific decree doc-
trine stem from how to instruct the jury on the issue of what
constitutes right and wrong. Beginning with then Judge Benjamin
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; A.B., History,
Davidson College, 2003. I would like to thank Dr. Jung H. Lee for his inspiration,
Professors Robert E. Rodes Jr., Richard W. Garnett, and Charles E. Rice for their
thoughts and comments, and my family and Courtney for their constant love and
support. I would also like to thank the editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
considerable efforts in preparing this work for publication.
1 Genesis 22:11 ("And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of heaven, and
said, Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I.").
2 The M'Naghten rule is a test for insanity where a person is not criminally re-
sponsible for an act when, by reason of mental disorder or disease, the person either
does not appreciate the nature and quality of the act or does not know whether the
act was right or wrong. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
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Cardozo, courts have blended a legal sense of right or wrong with a
religious vision of right and wrong for defendants suffering such
delusions. 3
There are times when a delusion simply triggers a religious duty,
which under current versions of the deific decree doctrine would not
be legal insanity. If, however, that delusion came from the Christian
God, there is a good chance a defendant would be legally insane. Re-
cently, some courts have attempted to take away from the doctrine's
usefulness to defendants, but these attempts still suffer from defini-
tional problems of right and wrong. 4 This Note will first detail the
evolution of the deific decree doctrine, demonstrating the tendency
for courts to distinguish cases of direct deific commands from relig-
ious duties triggered by delusions. Next, it will demonstrate that this
difference is flawed when considering the defendant's cognitive ability
to tell right from wrong in each situation. Finally, this Note will ex-
plain why the category of right and wrong in the M'Naghten test
should be a universal sense of right and wrong, taking a fair look at all
societal conceptions of religious duty, which will separate those who
have a valid insanity defense from those who personally believe in
breaking the law based on some higher telos.
I. EVOLUTION OF 'THE DEIFIC DECREE DOCTRINE
In the wake of American courts accepting the M'Naghten test for
legal insanity, they have struggled to define what constitutes right and
wrong. Starting with Judge Cardozo's opinion in People v. Schmidt,5
the doctrine has vacillated between a cognitive exception and a voli-
tional exception to the M'Naghten test. Ultimately, however, the doc-
trine rested on a cognitive exception to the M'Naghten test.
Judge Cardozo heard a case in which the defendant, Hans
Schmidt, lied by claiming insanity as a defense, asserting "he had
heard the voice of God calling upon him to kill the woman as a sacri-
fice and atonement,"6 and Judge Cardozo used the case to create a
cognitive exception to the M'Naghten test. On appeal, Schmidt admit-
ted he feigned insanity to conceal an abortion resulting in the victim's
3 See People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915); see also State v. Cameron, 674
P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983); State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
4 See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137-38 (Colo. 1992) (determining that
right and wrong means moral right and wrong determined by more objective societal
standards than other cases); see also State v. Boan, 686 P.2d 160, 171 (Kan. 1984)
(finding that right and wrong in these situations is a legal right and wrong and not "a
moral judgment, a religious judgment, [or] a social judgment").
5 110 N.E. 945.
6 Id. at 945.
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death. 7 The defendant hoped his admission would constitute new evi-
dence and lead to a new trial with a conviction for manslaughter at
most. According to judge Cardozo, however, the man's admission was
not "newly discovered evidence. '8
Even though the defendant admitted he had not heard the voice
of God, he still questioned the trial court's definition of wrong as
"contrary to the law of the state"9 in its insanity instruction. Judge
Cardozo agreed that the definition of wrong should be moral wrong,
finding that a much broader definition was appropriate in insanity
cases. In so doing, Judge Cardozo delved into a careful analysis of the
M'Naghten rule and the history of the insanity defense:
The [MNaghten] judges expressly held that a defendant who knew
nothing of the law would none the less be responsible if he knew
that the act was wrong, by which, therefore, they must have meant,
if he knew that it was morally wrong. Whether he would also be
responsible if he knew that it was against the law, but did not know
it to be morally wrong, is a question that was not considered.... But
none the less it is the knowledge of wrong, conceived of as moral
wrong, that seems to have been established by that decision as the
controlling test.10
In illustrating his point, he used a hypothetical where a person
could know the act was against the law, but still think she was justified
morally:
A mother kills her infant child to whom she has been devotedly
attached. She knows the nature and quality of the act; she knows
that the law condemns it; but she is inspired by an insane delusion
that God has appeared to her and ordained the sacrifice. It seems a
mockery to say that, within the meaning of the statute, she knows
the act is wrong.11
This hypothetical did not apply to the facts before him; yet, with this
hypothetical, Judge Cardozo spawned the legal theory of the deific
decree doctrine.
In 1961, the state of New Jersey acknowledged and adopted the
deific decree doctrine in State v. DiPaolo.12 The defendant murdered
his girlfriend, drove to the state police barracks, and confessed to the
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 946 (internal quotations omitted).
10 Id. at 947 (noting also that the predecessor for "right and wrong" was "good
and evil").
11 Id. at 949.
12 168 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1961).
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crime.1 3 According to the defendant, "God commanded his deed and
... at the time of the homicide he heard a 'voice' which directed him
to kill."1 4 Psychiatrists disagreed on the issue of insanity; yet, the court
still pronounced that "none suggested that if defendant in fact suf-
fered an insane delusion that God commanded the deed, he nonethe-
less was legally sane if he... appreciated that the deed was contrary to
law."1 5 The deific decree doctrine started to become entrenched as a
valid cognitive exception to the M'Naghten test.
II. DIRECT AND INDIRECT COMMANDS
The first twists on the deific decree doctrine occurred in Wash-
ington state during the mid-1980s. In 1983, the Washington Supreme
Court decided two cases that defined the limits of the doctrine and
provided the "foundation for the modern doctrine of deific decree. 1 6
The two cases illustrate the difference between a religious duty trig-
gered by a direct command and a personal belief in a religious duty
stemming from an indirect command or duty triggered by a delusion.
A command from God to the actor, usually in the form of a voice, is a
"direct" command, while a command or duty passed down through
religion is an "indirect" command.
A. Crenshaw
In State v. Crenshaw,1 7 the defendant had a delusion in which he
sensed his wife cheated on him. According to his equally delusional
version of Muscovite religion, he had a duty to kill his unfaithful wife.
His defense to the murder charge was an insane delusion (his wife's
unfaithfulness and his understanding of Muscovite religion) coupled
with a religious duty to act on the delusion. Crenshaw argued these
two factors made him unable to distinguish right from wrong.18 The
court rejected his defense and explained the narrow exception to the
legal/societal standard of wrong has been drawn in instances where
"the act is ordained by God," not situations where one follows the
"Muscovite Faith."1 9 The court looked for times during the incident
where Crenshaw acted rationally:
13 Id. at 403.
14 Id. at 407.
15 Id. at 408 (finding a moral wrong more suitable than a legal wrong).
16 Christopher Hawthorne, Comment, "Deific Decree". The Short, Happy Life of a
Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1755, 1799 (2000).
17 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
18 Id. at 491.
19 Id. at 494.
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If, arguendo, Crenshaw was delusional, his delusion was only partial,
for it related only to his perceptions of his wife's infidelity. His be-
havior towards others, i.e., the motel manager and the woman who
loaned him the ax, at the time of the killing was normal. Crenshaw
also "knew he was acting contrary to law," as evidenced by his so-
phisticated attempts to hide his crime and by the expert, psychiatric
testimony. Furthermore, he acted with a view "of redressing or re-
venging [the] supposed grievance" of his wife's infidelity. 20
The court used extraneous facts to distinguish this case because
the command did not come from God. Exhibiting signs of normal
rational function did not make Crenshaw able to understand what he
was doing was wrong. Although they may be probative of a rational
mind, in Crenshaw's mind, his action was rationale because he had a
religious duty to act.
The court in this instance misunderstood and misapplied the rea-
soning in Schmidt. Recall that Judge Cardozo was arguing for a stan-
dard of moral wrong when he cited his hypothetical. He believed that
a societal standard of moral wrong was sufficient to prove that the
delusive mother could not distinguish right from wrong. Here, the
court carved out an exception even if the defendant knew it to be
wrong by societal standards to commit the act. Judge Cardozo would
have argued that this person, even if ordained by God, made a choice
to reject the laws of society much the same way a polygamist does
when following her religious beliefs.21 Ultimately, the court affirmed
the trial court's refusal to give the special instruction because the act
was "clearly contrary to society's morals as well as the law, ' 22 and,
under these facts, "'moral' wrong and 'legal' wrong are
synonymous."
2 3
This type of case places the most strain on the deific decree doc-
trine because it blurs the line between cases of simple "moral obliq-
uity" and cases that render a defendant incapable of distinguishing
20 Id. at 492 (citations omitted).
21 See generally id. at 494 (noting the difference between the devotee of the relig-
ious cult and the person acting under a deific command); People v. Schmidt, 110
N.E. 945, 949-50 (N.Y. 1915) (citing the differences between the polygamist and the
devoted mother).
22 Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494. Societal standards are difficult to measure by a
court and are often left to the determination of the jury. The "common conscience"
is "so tenebrous and impalpable" that a court will have trouble defining it. Schmidt v.
United States, 177 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1949); see also Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 492-94
(finding that the jury, functioning as the conscience of the community, is well suited
to determine whether a defendant had the mental capacity to distinguish right from
wrong).
23 Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 491.
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between right and wrong with respect to the act. Moral obliquity is
the capacity to distinguish right from wrong while rejecting prevailing
moral standards. 24 Crenshaw is somewhere in between. 25 Crenshaw
was delusional and believed what he was doing was right, not against a
societal standard, but against his delusional Muscovite belief. In es-
sence, his insane delusions triggered a religious duty to act outside the
ethical norm towards a higher telos, but this norm cannot be mea-
sured objectively against societal standards, because courts find, objec-
tively, that his religion does not blur the line between right and
wrong. Courts refuse to give his delusion any exception to the prevail-
ing societal standards of right and wrong.
B. Cameron
In the other case it heard that term, State v. Cameron,26 the court
directly identified the difference between a direct command and an
indirect belief. Cameron confessed to stabbing his stepmother over
seventy times, defending his actions as being right "in the eye of
God." 27 Specifically, he claimed his stepmother was "very symbolic
with the 'Scarlet Whore Beast"' and like the "anti-God... [who] takes
the God's truth and twists it into her sorcery."28 Three psychiatrists
agreed that Cameron believed he was an agent of God carrying out
God's command. 29 The court found ample evidence that "it was im-
possible for him to understand that what he was doing was wrong" and
his "free will had been subsumed by his belief in the deific decree."30
By using this language, the court carved out both a cognitive excep-
tion and a volitional exception to the M'Naghten test and to the stan-
dard of moral wrong by societal standards. It went even further and
suggested a possible presumption: "Consequently, as we held in Cren-
shaw, one who believes that he is acting under the direct command of
God is no less insane because he nevertheless knows murder is prohib-
24 People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo. 1992).
25 Although the court characterized Crenshaw's delusional duty as a personal be-
lief, the court failed to see the cognitive part of the test in these situations. It viewed
Cardozo's hypothetical as a case of loss of free will or volition. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d
at 494 (finding that the mother's free will was "subsumed by her belief in the deific
decree").
26 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983).
27 Id. at 652.
28 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 654 (internal quotations omitted); see also Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494
(finding that Crenshaw knew his act was wrong both legally and against "the people").
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ited by the laws of man. Indeed, it may actually emphasize his
insanity. 31
The Washington Supreme Court next adopted almost completely
a volitional exception to M'Naghten. In State v. Rice,32 where the de-
fendant had only "urges" and thought he was in a battle with Satan,
the court stated that Cameron and other cases in the state allow for
insanity, in these instances, only if the defendant's free will has "been
subsumed by his belief in deific decree."33 Although this sounds as if
Washington courts have adopted solely a volitional exception, the pro-
posed instruction regarded "urges" the defendant was experiencing
and not commands. The defendant argued that these urges were ex-
amples of deific commands. 34 The defendant never alleged that he
was unable to determine right from wrong; in fact, he told his coun-
selor that he could follow them or not follow them. That is why the
court did not mention the question of moral wrong in the opinion.
The differences between Crenshaw and Cameron seem easy
enough. Crenshaw's delusion was not that God told him to murder
his wife, or even that God had informed him that she was unfaithful;
rather, he delusively sensed that she had been with another man and
followed a delusional tenet of the Muscovite religion, or what the
court termed a personal belief. Cameron's delusion was that he was
an agent of God, following God's command in killing the sorceress
that was his stepmother.
The difference, however, is not simply a direct and indirect com-
mand/delusion from God. The defendant's free will being subsumed
by the deific decree is important to the court. In certain situations,
both actors above could be incapable of knowing moral right and
wrong. For the Washington courts, even if Crenshaw could not sub-
jectively know right from wrong, his will was not subsumed by a deific
decree. Both defendants subjectively felt what they were doing was
right, but Crenshaw did not fit under the court's "narrow" excep-
tion.35 By forcing defendant to clear this second hurdle, that the free
will be subsumed by the command, the court distinguished the case of
a direct command (Cameron) from an indirect belief (Crenshaw).
31 Cameron, 674 P.2d at 654 (emphasis added).
32 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988).
33 Id. at 904.
34 Id.
35 See generally Cameron, 674 P.2d at 654 ("A narrow exception to the societal stan-
dard of moral wrong has been drawn for instances wherein a party performs a crimi-
nal act, knowing it is morally and legally wrong, but believing, because of a mental
defect, that the act is ordained by God." (quoting Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494)).
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This is the same line that Judge Cardozo drew over a half century
before.
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION? ANALYZING SERRAVO
Following these two cases, there have been several other cases try-ing to get a handle on the implications of the Washington court deci-sions. For instance, in People v. Serravo, the Colorado Supreme Courtrejected the deific decree doctrine as an exception to the societal stan-dard of moral wrong, calling it "an integral factor in assessing a per-son's cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect tothe act charged as a crime."36 Even so, the court went on to show theactual application of its standard may not be very different from the
Washington courts:
We thus conclude that, although the court of appeals mischaracter-ized the deific-decree delusion as an exception to the right-wrongtest for legal insanity, a defendant nonetheless may be judged le-gally insane where, as here, the defendant's cognitive ability to dis-tinguish right from wrong with respect to the act has beendestroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that has decreed the
act.
3 7
The most substantial addition to the deific decree doctrine by theSerravo court is the assertion that right and wrong must be judgedobjectively by societal standards and not subjective ones. 38 It is not
clear, however, how a jury is to apply this standard. The court sees
"[a] person's awareness of right and wrong" as deriving from a variety
of experiences, including behavioral rules enforced by the social cul-ture, ethical principles passed down through family, the formal educa-tional process, and religious associations.39 In the end, the courtdefines societal standards as "the total underlying conceptions of eth-ics shared by the community at large."40
Will twelve people with similar backgrounds and education, livingin the same enclave, and practicing different forms of the same relig-ion, truly represent the total conception of ethics shared by the com-munity at large? More likely, as shown below, a person must be under
36 823 P.2d 128, 139 (Colo. 1992). Contrastingly, in State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d1314 (N.J. 1990), NewJersey followed the traditional understanding and allowed foran instruction that wrong encompasses both legal and moral wrong in the "excep-tional case such as the deific exception." Id. at 1322.
37 Serravo, 823 P.2d at 141.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 137-38.
40 Id. at 138.
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a mental disease that so impairs him that he is unable to distinguish
between right and wrong defined by Christian ethical conceptions in
society. If the person only fails to distinguish right from wrong in his
own mind, under his own creed, or is morally obliquitous after his
delusion, a court will hold him criminally liable.
For instance, the Serravo court tried to come up with a more ob-
jective standard, fearing that "an accused could be adjudicated insane
even if he knew that the act in question was both forbidden by law and
condemned by society, but nonetheless harbored a personal belief
that the act was right."'4 1 People whose insanity triggers duties in
other faiths, or delusional versions of less mainstream faiths, will be
judged to have both appreciated that their acts were contrary to the
law and contrary to the shared conceptions of society as a whole, ulti-
mately being judged criminally responsible for their acts. The Serravo
court presumes that "a person is legally insane if that person's cogni-
tive ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the act has
been destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has com-
manded the act."42 It also seems clear that Colorado's definition of
"objective" societal standard of moral wrong in practice is roughly
equivalent with Christianity, leaving those delusional persons with less
"societal" faiths out of luck even if they go through the same cognitive
process, resulting in the same inability to judge right from wrong. If
this is truly a cognitive exception, and if the two cognitive processes
are essentially the same, courts should treat them equally.
In the end, Serravo suffers from the same direct/indirect problem
seen in the Washington courts. Although not phrased in those terms,
the essence of the reasoning is the same. Using an objective societal
standard of morals, the court would protect a person who was under
the direct command of God, while guarding against another delusion
that triggers a religious duty, which they characterized as a personal
belief.43 Ultimately, this is the same distinction (direct/indirect) the
Washington court observed in Crenshaw and Cameron, but simply
phrased differently.
IV. SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
More recently, however, Washington courts have scaled back
their approach to deific decrees. In State v. Potter, the court dismissed
the possibility of a volitional exception through deific decree.
Namely, the court felt the interpretation of Rice which gave rise to the
41 Id.
42 Id. at 140.
43 Id. at 138.
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volitional exception was against a long line of cases "rejecting the irre-
sistible impulse defense."44 Moreover, in a 2004 unpublished opinion,
a Washington State court of appeals declared it was not error to give
an instruction in a deific decree case where "wrong" was undefined. 45
Although there has been some wavering in the recent past, the
deific decree doctrine is ingrained in most M'Naghtenjurisdictions.46
These recent variations point to an instruction that is flawed in two
major ways. First, it fails to separate moral wrong's theistic and legal
aspects. Some cases call the doctrine an exception to the societal stan-
dard of moral wrong,47 and others feel moral wrong encompasses the-
istic as well as societal morals.48 Secondly, the distinction between
direct and indirect delusions holds no water in a truly cognitive excep-
tion when one closely examines the psychology of what happens in
"Movements of Faith." These two aspects are more fully explored be-
low, showing there are few differences between the situation in Cren-
shaw and that of the traditional deific decree, represented by Judge
Cardozo's devoted mother.
In the end, however, the weight of authority makes appropriate
the following instruction in cases of deific decree:
You can find the [defendant] not guilty by reason of insanity if you
find that [defendant] believed he was acting under a direct com-
mand of God and that belief prevented him from comprehending
the act with which he is charged was morally wrong [as defined by
moral conceptions of society] or prevented the defendant from per-
ceiving the nature and quality of his act. 49
44 State v. Potter, 842 P.2d 481, 487 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
45 See, e.g., State v. Turgeon, No. 49535-6-I, 2004 WL 555278, at. *2 (Wash. Ct.
App. Mar. 22, 2004) (choosing not to define wrong as a legal wrong or a moral wrong
but leaving it to the jury to decide).
46 M'Naghtenjurisdictions include New York, NewJersey, Ohio, Colorado, Califor-
nia, Washington, and formerly Kansas, to name a few.
47 See State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
48 For the traditional view, see People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
49 See Potter, 842 P.2d at 486; People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137-38 (Colo.
1992). Many other M'Naghten jurisdictions follow this holding. See, e.g., People v.
Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1180 (Cal. 2000).
Neither was it of consequence what Coddington's notion of morality might
have been. Then and now, if a person believes that he is commanded by
God to act as he does, whatever his views of morality might be, he is incapa-
ble of recognizing that his act is morally wrong. That is the square holding
of Skinner, which dealt with a defendant who "held" a "belief ... that the
marriage vow 'till death do us part' bestows on a marital partner a God-given
right to kill the other partner who has violated or was inclined to violate the
marital vows."
Id. (quoting People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 755 (Cal. 1985)).
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V. THE PROBLEM WITH A DIRECT/INDIRECT DISTINCTION
Judge Cardozo distinguished between a person who directly hears
a deific decree and one who simply believes in the tenets of his faith,
which gives the actor a duty to act contrary to the law. 5
0 Yet, as shown
above, deific decree is, in most cases, a cognitive exception to the
M'Naghten test. Namely, the person is unable to distinguish right from
wrong because God directed her to act contrary to the law. In both
cases, where one believes in the tenets of her faith and where she
hears a deific command, at some point, prior to the act, the person
chooses to have faith in God, triggering a religious duty. Otherwise,
the voice of God would be meaningless, especially when telling a per-
son to act contrary to the law as she knows it. As a cognitive exception
to the test, therefore, it does not matter when one decides that God's
law should reign over the law of men or what delusions triggered the
duty.
The question is when God commands an illegal act, is a person
able to distinguish right from wrong based objectively on society's
moral concepts? In 1913, the laws of God and the laws of man repre-
sented the majority of society's moral code. The laws of man were not
fundamental notions of what is right and wrong developed in a soci-
ety; rather, they were laws codified in books and expressed in opinions
derived from judges responding to the common law. The Bible heav-
ily influenced society's moral code. This is why Judge Cardozo limited
the choice of definitions to the laws of God and the laws of man.
51
Since that time, especially in the United States, morality has become
more than the laws of God and the laws of man. In a land known for
its tolerance, society's moral standard could be starkly different espe-
cially when comparing smaller community beliefs to those of a more
urban population.
Following this line of thinking, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Ballard, found that proof of a religious belief, including "mys-
tic" experiences, could not be submitted to the jury to verify the truth
of such a belief.52 The government accused the Ballards, who claimed
to have communicated with Jesus and Saint Germaine, of using the
50 See Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 950 ("The devotee of a religious cult that enjoins polyg-
amy or human sacrifice as a duty is not thereby relieved from responsibility before the
law."); see also Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494 ("His personal belief that it was his duty to kill
his wife for her alleged infidelity cannot serve to exculpate him from legal responsibil-
ity."); State v. DiPaolo, 168 A.2d 401, 408 (NJ. 1961) (citing Schmidt's proposition that
the religious devotee is not relieved of responsibility before the law).
51 See Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 949.
52 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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mail to defraud members of their religious movement. 53 Although
"[m]en may believe what they cannot prove," their religious beliefs
and doctrines should not be put on trial.54 This problem of proof has
its limitations, however. For the Court, freedom of religion embraced
two concepts: "freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. ' 55
This case echoes the policy behind the deific decree doctrine.
First, morally and probably legally, the actor would be justified if God
actually commanded the act; however, as shown above, courts cannot
let such an issue go to thejury. Instead, in cases of deific decree, they
presume insanity, only forcing the defense to prove the defendant
could not comprehend right from wrong. The law, in some way, gives
the defendant the freedom to believe (not to be subject to proving
that it was God speaking), but restrains the defendant's freedom to
act. The law will not impede religious acts unless those acts interfere
with the "laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity,
and the morals of the people."56
The Supreme Court might as well have been echoing the views of
Schmidt. Judge Cardozo based his opinion that all voices said to be of
God must be a delusion on Kantian philosophy.57 Namely, Kant be-
lieved reason was crippled when dealing with miracles and known law
and that any voice that commands people to do something contrary to
morality is an illusion.58 Even if such miracles are possible, man can-
not comprehend them and should "attend to the commands of rea-
son. '59 Little doubt exists that the deific decree doctrine stemmed
53 Id. at 81-82.
54 Id. at 86; see also id. at 93 (Jackson,J., dissenting) ("[I]t seems to me an impos-
sible task for juries to separate fancied [mystic experiences] from real ones, dreams
from happenings, and hallucinations from true clairvoyance.").
55 Id. at 86 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)).
56 Id. at 87 (quoting Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)).
57 See IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE (Theodore
M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper 1960) (1793).
58 Id. at 81-82; see IMMANUEL KANT, THE CoNFLIcT OF THE FACULTIES 115 (MaryJ.
Gregor trans., Abaris Books 1979) (1798).
For if God should really speak to man, man could still never know that it was
God speaking.... But in some cases man can be sure that the voice he hears
is not God's; for if the voice commands him to do something contrary to the
moral law, then no matter how majestic the apparition may be, and no mat-
ter how it may seem to surpass the whole of nature, he must consider it an
illusion.
Id. Kant believes Abraham should have responded to God by saying he is certain he
should not kill his good son and will never be certain that this voice is truly God's. Id.
59 KANT, supra note 57, at 83.
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from this tradition. Presumptively, any voice coming from "God" is a
delusion because humans are unable to comprehend the voice even if
it were real. Therefore, when "God" speaks, courts presume it is a
delusion and through society's morality, often based on Christian con-
cepts, a jury can find that the actor cannot distinguish between right
and wrong.
To illustrate a facially ideal example of deific decree that be-
comes less ideal as more facts are uncovered, this Note borrows a story
from an unreported case in California of a man who "sacrificed" his
daughter. 60 The defendant, named Cristos Valenti by the author,
seemed competent when questioned by a court-appointed
psychologist:
Psychologist: Why are laws necessary?
Defendant: Laws are for everybody because there's a lot of
trouble out there.
Psychologist: Thou shalt not kill, what about that law?
Defendant: That's God's commandment.
Psychologist: Did you break the law?
Defendant: Yes and no. I did break it because the Bible says
that, but I didn't break it because God told me
to.
6 1
This is the quintessential example of the deific decree-one that
Judge Cardozo would find a delusion. When examining this man's
life more closely, however, we learn of his deep Christian faith that
ultimately led him to his decision to sacrifice his daughter. Valenti
made this decision rationally by studying the tenets of his faith and
choosing to reject society and follow his own personal belief.
There is little doubt that a voice alone compelling the defendant
to commit an act contrary to morality would not prevent the defen-
dant from distinguishing right from wrong.6 2 For instance, the defen-
dant above was originally "confused by God's request and went inside
60 This example is taken from CAROL DELANEY, ABRAHAM ON TRIAL: THE SOCIAL
LEGACY OF BIBLICAL MYrH (1998). Delaney uses pseudonyms and relies on her first-
hand account of what occurred as she attended this man's trial. The judge instructed
the jury that the defendant must have been able to distinguish between legal and
moral right and wrong at the time of the act. Id. at 64 (following the holding in People
v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985)); see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61 DELANEY, supra note 60, at 58.
62 A voice even from the Devil would not make a person unable to distinguish
right from wrong because the Devil is known to be evil:
There is something more sympathetic about a person who says it is God, not
the devil, who is telling him what to do. It casts the perpetrator in a better
light.... But it is a two-edged sword because if you do evil at the command
of God, it almost seems hypocritical. It is easier to understand if evil things
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to read the [B]ible about sacrifices."6" No doubt, the defendant
turned to the Abraham story in Genesis and other biblical references
to sacrifice and followed scripture in making his decision. 64 We learn,
"[w]hen God came into his life ... he followed God's orders."65 Ac-
cording to the psychiatrists, witnesses, and police, the defendant func-
tioned well-he was able to plan and execute everyday activities. 66 He
was even able to distinguish between moral right and wrong in some
sense. He told psychologists "you could look at it as wrong because it
is against the commandment... I saw it as doing what God wanted me
to do." 67 In plain meaning, this is distinguishing between moral right
and wrong; he just subjectively believed what he was doing was right.
This tells a story absent in most cases. Cases present the facts as
they relate to the insanity plea; they rarely tell the story about what
leads to a person's decision to follow the voices commanding him to
act contrary to the law and how the jury reacts to those decisions. Yet,
it is precisely this cognitive aspect of each defendant's decision/rela-
tion with religion/God that blurs the line between right and wrong.
The defendant above would not have acted on the voice's command if
the Bible did not have the Abraham story and if he were not a man of
faith.
This example illustrates a choice made by a man. At some point,
the defendant read the Bible and made the choice to follow a higher
law. The problem here is that, in essence, this is the same act of faith
that Crenshaw made, yet he was unable to use the deific decree doc-
trine to get a proper definition of "distinguishing right from wrong" at
trial so jurors could be more sympathetic as they were in Valenti's
case.
Valenti was acquitted by a jury of his peers based on an instruc-
tion stemming from a California court decision dealing with deffic de-
cree doctrine. 68 Society, in the form of the jury, related with Valenti's
obedience:
are done at the command of evil. Then there is no such contradiction, not
such a paradox.
DELANEY, supra note 60, at 45 (quoting the trial judge in a personal interview).
63 Id. at 58 (quoting the defendant's son).
64 See Genesis 22; Judgments 11; Exodus 13:2; Exodus 22:29. This is probably what
the defendant above was reading. He missed, however, the change in Genesis from
sacrifice to circumcision; both were to be done on the eighth day, with circumcision
symbolically replacing all sacrifice. See Genesis 17:12; Leviticus 12:3.
65 DELANEY, supra note 60, at 58 (quoting the defendant's son).
66 Id. at 63.
67 Id. at 64.
68 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The judge's actual jury instruction:
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One woman Uuror] said she had divorced the Catholic Church ....
She had missed mass a couple of times and went to the priest to
confess. But, instead of absolving her, he raged at her, "You don't
deserve to be in Catholic school," and told her to get a transfer to a
public school.6
9
Six of the women jurors had been raised Catholic, only one male juror
was raised without religion, and all but two knew the story of Abra-
ham. 70 Valenti's religion, Christianity, is society's moral compass as
shown by the jurors assigned to this case. Even though Valenti chose
the laws of God over the laws of man, much in the same way Crenshaw
did, Christianity is accepted by jurors, while a delusional Muscovite
belief is simply not.
There are many problems with this conception. Members of a
minority faith or moral code who are entirely protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, who then receive a delusion from their God or even
some other delusion that triggers a religious duty, will probably not be
acquitted because objectively they knew it was against the laws of soci-
ety and a juror applying that standard will have difficulty relating. As
shown below, Valenti's Movement of Faith or "trial" is in no way differ-
ent from Crenshaw's, except that society views Christianity as the basis
of its morals. Both have similar cognitive movements. They both suf-
fered a delusion that triggered a religious duty to act. Society related
to Valenti in a way it did not get the chance to with Crenshaw.
VI. MOVEMENTS OF FAITH
Perhaps the most widely recognized meditation on the psychol-
ogy of faith comes from Soren Kierkegaard. 7 1 Kierkegaard wrote in
the literary guise ofJohannes de Silentio, a man dealing with the para-
dox of faith. He uses the story of Abraham to illustrate the mechanics
of faith. For Abraham, loving his son more than himself was the high-
est moral expression. 72 Yet Abraham, by his actions, acted immorally
In order to find the defendant sane, you must find that at the time of the
commission of the crime he was capable of distinguishing between legal
right and wrong with respect to the act and you must find that he was capa-
ble of distinguishing between moral right and wrong with respect to the act.
DELANEY, supra note 60, at 64.
69 DELANEY, supra note 60, at 47.
70 Id. at 47, 50.
71 This Note will draw heavily from SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING
(Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1846),
for its descriptions of the mechanics of faith.
72 Id. at 57-59 (noting that the "noble" thing for Abraham to do, as tragic hero,
would have been to sacrifice himself in place of his son).
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by sacrificing Isaac, ultimately acting on a higher telos which is some-
where above and outside the normal legal telos commanded by law.73
In fact, knowing that the action lies outside the ethical/universal,
knowing that he will be hated, is what makes the Movement of Faith
such a paradox. It is completely outside ethical comprehension and
expression.7 4 If faith is taken away, "all that remains is the brutal fact
that Abraham meant to murder Isaac. '75 According to Kierkegaard,
the individual must resign the ethical/universal world, rise above it,
leaping into the absurd so that by sacrificing her, "I will get her-that
is, by virtue of the absurd, in virtue of the fact that for God all things
are possible." 76
Importantly, some commentators have stressed the relationship
between God and Abraham as a precursor to Abraham's decision re-
garding Isaac. 77 Namely, the narrative of Genesis presents a relation-
ship of trust between Abraham and God that makes Abraham's
decision to sacrifice Isaac appear more rational and less paradoxical
then when looking at the trial itself:
In examining the relationship between Abraham and God in the
Abrahamic narrative... certain salient features of the relationship
emerge .... [T]he relationship possesses the character of respon-
siveness, both in the way that communication proceeds via dialogue
and the manner in which it is guided by concern .... More than
unconscious reaction to external stimuli, response represents a self-
conscious process of interpretation and engagement where one in-
terprets not only the present set of actions which immediately affect
the agent but the entire pattern of past actions and possible future
actions.78
The significance of this idea comes from the mechanics of the
decisionmaking process. God's voice alone, absent the historical rela-
tionship depicted in the Genesis narrative, would not have moved
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and Abraham's decision would not have
been as rational a decision. The key conceptual issue is that some-
where in each individual's relationship with/to God they begin to be-
lieve in Him. In essence, they make a choice between the "law of God
73 Id. at 76.
74 Id. at 120.
75 Id. at 30.
76 Id. at 46.
77 Jung H. Lee, Abraham in a Different Voice: Rereading Fear and Trembling with
Care, 36 RELIGIOUS STUD. 377 (2000) (arguing that Abraham's Movement of Faith can
be read as an ethical response within the grammar of care where Abraham's trial is a
response to the historical relationship between him and God).
78 Lee, supra note 77, at 389-90.
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and man. ' 79 When they make this decision, striving toward a "higher"
telos, they have made a Movement of Faith. Important in this move-
ment is the historical relationship between the person and God.
The process of faith depends on a relationship with God over the
course of a lifetime. This decision is made either before the defen-
dant hears the voice of God or after a historical relationship between
the defendant and God, and this decision will direct how the defen-
dant responds. In this sense, it does not seem different from the per-
son who believes in the voice of a priest or preacher who is a vehicle
for God and then wrongly commits an act because of a delusion.
80
VII. CRENSHAW, VALENTI, AND DEIFIC DECREE
An instance where a defendant's delusion lacked a direct com-
mand from God occurred in Crenshaw. The defendant followed his
own delusive Muscovite belief, not the tenets of that religion.81
Clearly, the defendant believed his act was ordained by his faith and,
therefore, morally acceptable. That said, however, he was not allowed
the instruction for distinguishing between a moral and legal wrong.
The court concluded: "Petioner's crime, killing his wife by stabbing
her twenty-four times then hacking off her head, is clearly contrary to
society's morals as well as the law. Therefore by defining wrong in
79 People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915).
80 Of course, the Catholic tradition has a completely different take on this. Faith
and reason work together to produce an objective body of knowledge put forth
through the Pope as arbiter. In that sense, the Catholic tradition wants to remedy the
'tendency to grant the individual conscience the prerogative of independently deter-
mining the criteria of good and evil and acting accordingly. . . wherein each individ-
ual is faced with his own truth different from the truth of others." POPEJOHN PAUL II,
FIDES ET RATIO ch. VII, 1 98 (1998). In the instance of deific decree, the Catholic
Church would teach the defendant to consult the Church and not individually evalu-
ate the command. In contrast, Kierkegaard would find the Catholic Church as "not
qualitatively different from.., the state." A person who is sponsored by the Church
comes to his decision by a "simple meditation," and will be understood by all in the
Church-this is no longer a temptation and no longer a trial because the Church
grounds the act in the universal/ethical. Such a person is incapable of being a true
Knight of Faith. The Knight of Faith goes against society by rejecting its norms as
Abraham did, sacrificing his son even though society will hate him for it. See KIERKE-
GAARD, supra note 71, at 74.
81 State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 494 (Wash. 1983); see also Hawthorne, supra
note 16, at 1801-02 (commenting on Crenshaw's disordered mind when he believed
he was following his faith and noting the defendant satisfied one of the elements of
Cardozo's deific decree: "a moral choice within the parameters of a mental
disorder").
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terms of legal wrong, the trial court did not alter the meaning of the
M'Naghten test."8 2
The court's response to such a defense was that the person "knew
that the act was morally and legally wrong but he personally believed
the act right."83 Somehow, for the Crenshaw court, the direct com-
mand of God makes the act morally ambiguous when the actor is
under the direct delusion, whereas the actor clearly knows the act is
morally wrong when under the indirect command of God. This is
clearly inconsistent.
People acting under indirect commands from God go through
the same mental processes as those under direct commands from
God. The reasoning for only recognizing direct commands as over-
coming the defendant's cognitive ability to know right from wrong is
that people who follow religious tenets that produce duties contrary to
the law have made a premeditated choice.84 As shown above, how-
ever, even Abraham made a premeditated choice to follow God's com-
mands through a historical relationship. Valenti also made a
premeditated choice; he even researched sacrifices in the Bible and
contemplated his past relationship with God before committing the
act.8 5 Recall that this doctrine is a cognitive exception to the
M'Naghten test. There is no requirement that the person instantly fol-
low God's command. Valenti deliberately and methodically searched
the Bible for answers and he personally came to one answer-that
God commanded him to sacrifice his daughter. 86
Valenti and Crenshaw have much in common. Both actors went
through the same mental steps in committing their acts. First, both
were hit with delusional external stimuli. Valenti heard the voice of
God while Crenshaw delusively believed his wife cheated on him.
Next, they both checked their "moral" authorities to determine how
to act, and each triggered a religious duty. In the above example,
Valenti read the Bible, learned of the duty to have faith in God and
followed His orders, even if He ordained sacrifice. He followed the
Abraham story to the letter, only this time there was no Angel to keep
his hand from using the knife. Crenshaw studied his faith and delu-
sively believed he had a religious duty to kill his "unfaithful" wife.
They both committed the act and followed a duty.
82 Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
83 Id. at 493-94 (quoting State v. Corley, 495 P.2d 470, 473 (Ariz. 1972)).
84 See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488; People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
85 DELANEV, supra note 60, at 58.
86 Id.
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Crenshaw was guilty because if everything were "true" (there were
no delusions) he would not be 'justified" morally by our Christian
standards, i.e., he truly would be able to tell right from wrong because
he knows society and the law forbid his act. Moreover, the judge
would not give the jury the opportunity to empathize with a man con-
fused over what he perceived to be reality, and what his equally delu-
sional faith told him was right. One can also surmise that Crenshaw
loved his new wife and deliberated over killing her.87 Unlike his mon-
strous portrayal in the case, Crenshaw may have been like the devoted
mother, struggling to answer God's command.
On the other hand, jurors related to Valenti. The mostly Chris-
tian jurors recalled the story of Abraham, they recalled the Catholic
Church teaching them obedience, and they believed he truly could
not tell right from wrong based on their perceptions. He deliberated
over killing his daughter. These two men went through a similar
mental process; yet, because one is Christian and the other is a be-
liever in a delusional version of the Muscovite religion, they are af-
forded different opportunities.
It is the law's job, not that of the Bible, to control people's actions
in society. The Christian is not justified spiritually by the law but by
God alone.88 In that sense, either both of these examples should be
examples of the same acts of insanity, or the law should not recognize
either.
VIII. THE ANSWER TO THE INCONSISTENCY: A NEW CATEGORY
OF WRONG
The problem directly relates to the definition of wrong used in
instances only when there is a direct command from God. The courts
use both a legal and societal wrong when instructing the jury with
respect to the M'Naghten test. A better test would be to separate the
religious connotations contained in "moral wrong" and replace it with
a category of universal wrong based on shared conceptions of what an
entire society believes to be ethical or unethical. Juries would need to
recognize alternative forms of beliefs that produce religious duties.
Basically, there needs to be a definition of right and wrong that en-
87 Crenshaw's story was left out of the opinion for the most part. The judge
painted the opinion for the conclusion he wanted to reach. Therefore, Crenshaw
looks more like a monster than a person undergoing a trial. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d
488.
88 See generally KIERKEGAARD, supra note 71, at 83-120 (noting in Problema III
Abraham's inability to express his act ethically because the ethical (saving Isaac or
sacrificing himself in Isaac's place) was his temptation-instead he stood in absolute
relation to the Absolute which has no ethical/moral expression).
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compasses various sets of beliefs or one that just concerns itself with a
legal right and wrong. Otherwise, people who truly cannot tell what is
right or wrong based on some delusional religious duty (Crenshaw) or
some other moral compass will be caught admitting that they knew
the act was legally wrong and wrong based on society's conception,
and, therefore, held to be sane.
This category works for two reasons. First, the person who makes
a choice to believe in God, or a Movement of Faith, regardless of that
faith, will be as protected as the Christian who hears God's command.
Second, this category is better than the alternative of legal right and
wrong. These people are insane when they believe in a higher telos
which tells them to do something inconsistent with the laws of our
society. They are truly unable to tell right from wrong, and broaden-
ing the societal standard will include those caught in a similar situa-
tion. Yet, this category may still exclude Judge Cardozo's polygamist
who holds a subjective belief that the law of God is above the law of
man, absent some delusion that blurs the line of right from wrong.
Polygamy is a bad example because it traces its route to a delusion.
Somewhere in the chain of their religion someone had what a court
would call a delusion. In addition, if God called each polygamist to
practice polygamy, there can be an argument for deific decree. A bet-
ter example is the anarchist who, because he believes government is
inherently bad, acts on the belief out of moral obliquity. A standard
of wrong that encompasses differing faiths would not see this person
as having a duty to act, but rather a choice. Basically, the court should
recognize that universal wrong includes a situation where everyone's
God or belief system trumps the law of man when triggered through a
delusional episode, while mere belief systems that do not trigger the
same absolute duty will be left without the defense.
Although "[m] ost cases involving the insanity defense involve se-
rious crimes for which society's moral judgment is identical with the
legal standard,"89 there are certainly instances where that line is
blurred by delusions. For instance, in Cameron, the defendant suf-
fered from a delusion not only that God commanded him to kill his
stepmother, but also that his stepmother was a demon and "became
very violent with me, with a knife in her hand."90 Even if the defen-
dant knew it was legally wrong to kill his stepmother, a jury could
come to the conclusion that, universally, he could not distinguish that
it was wrong to do so. Many societies have this basic notion of good
and evil, possession, and the duties triggered by such events. On the
89 Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
90 State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 651 (Wash. 1983).
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other hand, the polygamist or an anarchist, who believes the laws are
wrong, will not be allowed an instruction in this new category. They
are not under a delusion.
The countervailing argument is that legal right and wrong should
be the only standard. True "Knights of Faith" resigned the earthly
world to let go of the earthly love they carry for their fathers, mothers,
wife, children, and brothers and sisters.91 Movements of Faith are
coupled with Movements of Resignation, where the mover waives any
claim to the earthly, which is grounded in society and consensus, to
express it spiritually.92 This is what enables Abraham to go through
with the sacrifice. If he is tied to the earthly, he makes the decision to
become the tragic hero, but the real Knight of Faith is not a hero. A
tragic hero "needs and demands tears" so his task is grounded in uni-
versal acceptance and admiration. 93 The Knight of Faith, on the
other hand, resigns the universal and dares you "not to weep for me,
but weep for yourself."94 Similarly, he has neither need nor desire to
escape earthly punishment for his deed. The true believer will accept
his fate as ordained by God.
This course of action seems to indicate that those acting on a true
delusion and who are possibly insane will still be punished and pub-
licly put to death. The policy behind the insanity defense stems from
not wanting to execute someone who is mentally incapacitated. 95
These people would be unfairly punished by our legal system if we did
not recognize an exception to the normal definition of right and
wrong in this instance.
Overall, this is not a perfect answer, and no perfect answer exists.
This suggestion keeps the law consistent. In the end, society has laws
to protect innocent people. This suggestion keeps innocent people
from being hurt by forcing those who made a choice to follow faith
and violate the law to be accountable when they knew what they were
doing violated the law and a wide array of established public norms.
Those who are truly insane should be able to pass the standard if they
91 Matthew 10:37; Luke 14:26 ("If any man come to me, and hate not his father,
and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life
also, he cannot be my disciple."). Kierkgaard sees this verse as a way to determine if a
person can become a Knight of Faith. The absolute duty/love one owes to God can
lead one, as in the case of Abraham, to do what ethics forbids. This verse only means
something if the disciple loves his relatives with all his soul, otherwise he could not
sacrifice them. See KIERKEGAARD, supra note 71, at 72-74.
92 KIERKEGAARD, supra note 71, at 46.
93 Id. at 60-61.
94 Id. at 66.
95 People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
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are so deluded as to not be able to distinguish between right and
wrong when committing the act. Those who made lucid decisions,
based on teachings and experiences absent a delusional episode, will
not be spared by this doctrine. Moral obliquity will be punished,
while two Movements of Faith, regardless of their origin, will be
treated the same.
In almost all cases, faith is not a defense to criminal acts, and
faith, alone, should not be a defense in these situations. Under a cog-
nitive exception, however, the cognitive movements are exactly the
same for Crenshaw as they are for Valenti and the devoted mother,
and they should all be treated equally under the law.
CONCLUSION
Early in 2004, in New Hampshire, a mother told police she
wanted to kill her kids on the altar of a Roman Catholic Church. 96
Police recalled her saying 'Jesus sacrificed himself for her, so she was
going to sacrifice her sons to free her soul."97 She believed that her
little son had the Devil in him because he was autistic. Police sus-
pected he would be the one she sacrificed. This woman did not hear
the word of God; thus, her defense will be more difficult.
In Texas, a woman was acquitted of murdering two of her sons
(one survived the attack) because "[she] believed God had told her
the world was going to end and 'she had to get her house in order,'
which included killing her children."98 She smashed the head of her
infant son with a rock and then calmly walked inside to do the same to
her two older boys.99 The public defender followed the Abraham
story perfectly, saying "he would present witnesses who would corrobo-
rate Laney's love of her children as well as her belief 'that the word of
God was infallible."' 100 The public defender displayed the paradox
that has been equated with faith and insanity:
Defense attorneys argued that insanity was the only reason why a
deeply religious mother who homeschooled her children would kill
two of them and maim another without so much as a tear.... Psy-
chiatrists testified that Laney believed she was divinely chosen by
96 Brian Dekoning, Woman Who Allegedly Threatened to Kill Sons Arraigned,
MANCHESTER UNION LEADER (Nov. 14, 2004).
97 Id.
98 Cable News Network LP, Mom Who Said She Killed on God's Orders Acquitted, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/04/03/children.slain (April 3, 2005).
99 Cable News Network LP, Attorney: Woman Thought God Told Her to Kill Sons, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/29/children.slain (March 29, 2005).
100 Id.
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God-just as Mary was chosen to bear Christ-to kill her children as
a test of faith and then serve as a witness after the world ended.'0 1
The differences between these two examples illustrate the prob-
lem with the deific decree doctrine. In the first, the special instruc-
tion is not applicable because the mother's action was triggered by a
religious belief, not a direct command from God. In the second, be-
cause God told the mother to act, she would receive a special instruc-
tion explaining that because she knew the act was against the law, but
thought it was morally right, she could not distinguish between right
and wrong. Two mothers equally love their children, are equally delu-
sive, and equally believe what they are doing is morally right, yet they
are treated differently under the current law. This Note is just one
attempt to remedy this problem.
101 Texas Woman Who Killed Kids Acquitted, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-04-03-texas-woman-acquitted-x.htm?
poe=newisva. Interestingly, in this example, the mother did not kill the third infant
son. She said she could not do anymore and asked the Lord to finish for her. Id.
The prosecution took this as her knowing right from wrong-but ultimately she was
acquitted.
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